Assessment of the Pace of U.S.-Iran Negotiations

Currently, the prevailing view is that the U.S. and Iran will ultimately engage in peace talks. The pace is likely to mirror that of the tariff and trade wars—dragging on, with cycles of conflict and negotiation, taking a long time. However, the basic framework may be finalized by the end of April. We cannot rule out a final round of high-stakes brinkmanship before then, nor can we rule out unexpected complications during the negotiations, attempts by the U.S. to seize nuclear materials, or further assassinations by Israel. Nevertheless, the current assessment is that there is a high probability the situation will be resolved by the end of April.

The Protracted Nature of the Middle East Conflict

But can a single agreement truly stabilize the Middle East? Of course not—just like the US-China tariff and trade wars. The US and China launched a tariff war in April 2025. Trump subsequently backed down, but once financial markets stabilized, he returned with a vengeance in September 2025, introducing export control “piercing rules.” In response, China implemented unprecedented rare earth controls: any product containing even 0.1% Chinese rare earths would be subject to restrictions.

This latest attack on Iran by the US and Israel is also aimed at securing more leverage for negotiations with China. The US and China have already engaged in at least three rounds of strategic maneuvering. Not only is the standoff between the US and China a protracted struggle, but the conflict involving the US, Iran, and Israel will also be a protracted one. After a lull of a few months, another round will likely ensue. Moreover, with six wars already fought in the Middle East, it is impossible to achieve lasting peace through a single agreement. However, a brief period of peace before the end of April is still possible—though this is merely my speculation and may not be accurate.

If my assessment is wrong, and if the war continues into May, then I, with my limited knowledge, cannot predict what Trump will do. But I have truly done my best. Based on my current judgment, the conflict should de-escalate significantly by the end of April. If the war continues into May, we will adjust our strategy. If my judgment is wrong, the only thing we can do is adjust promptly to respond to the new situation.

Strategy for Hedging Against Risks in Both Directions

So far, the safest approach is to hedge against risks in both directions. Simply put, my stance is neutral. I do not believe Trump will bring the Middle East to its knees, nor do I believe he will withdraw immediately. I believe Trump will go back and forth on the negotiations several more times, and a formal outcome will not emerge until the end of April.

Therefore, I must guard against both hawkish and dovish risks:

  • Hawkish Risk: Fighting continues into May, resulting in a market crash
  • Dovish Risk: Trump suddenly backs down, causing us to miss a buying opportunity

The Current State and Future of the Dollar’s Hegemony

We’ve already discussed the so-called dollar hegemony in the previous two videos. Losing the Middle East will undoubtedly impact the dollar’s hegemony—there’s no question about that. However, dollar hegemony won’t be overturned overnight; the media has been exaggerating this a bit.

If the U.S. is concerned about dollar hegemony, its next targets would be grain transactions in Ukraine and mineral exports from South America, both settled in dollars. Implementing this would be far easier than directly confronting Iran. The U.S. has strong influence in South America and has orchestrated numerous color revolutions there. On April 7, Dongda Port signed a protocol with Ukraine regarding inspection, quarantine, and sanitary requirements for Ukrainian wheat flour exports to China—a move that may indicate Dongda is preparing for future grain supply needs. Following the outbreak of conflict between the U.S. and Iran, Dongda immediately expanded its natural gas cooperation with Turkmenistan.

Beyond tying oil, grain, and minerals together, the simplest way to restore the dollar’s purchasing power is actually to drastically reduce tariffs on China. As long as the money printed can buy more goods, purchasing power can effectively be enhanced. As long as Trump wants to win, he has various ways to declare victory. For example, he could publicize the following:

  • The reason Iran is willing to negotiate is because it fears America’s threat of war
  • The reason the negotiations succeeded is because Iran promised not to develop nuclear weapons
  • The reason tariffs on China were lowered is because China promised to invest in the U.S.

At this point, nothing Trump says surprises me. Of course, these are all just methods to keep the dollar’s hegemony on life support. Unless the U.S. reforms its fiscal system, curtails the power of regional fiefdoms, and cracks down on monopolistic giants, the dollar’s hegemony will inevitably weaken sooner or later.

The basic model of dollar hegemony is a circulation system: using the dollar to tie up various commodities. In reality, this is an outflow—focusing only on sending money out without considering what comes in. The end result is what happened to the yen. Japan printed a lot of money in the past, but in the end, it all flowed out to other markets to speculate on assets in other countries.

If the goal is to bring overseas dollars back to the U.S. to invest in U.S. Treasuries and stocks, the prerequisite is that U.S. Treasuries and stocks must not crash. If both U.S. Treasuries and stocks crash, and if the U.S. enters a deep recession, even if all the world’s oil were settled in dollars and you earned dollars, you wouldn’t buy U.S. Treasuries or stocks.

In 2008, U.S. dollar hegemony was at its peak, but after the U.S. printed money to bail out the market, massive amounts of capital actually flowed into Europe and China. At that time, U.S. multinational capital preferred to invest in China rather than in the United States. It was only after the European debt crisis and the Russia-Ukraine conflict that capital began to flow back to the U.S. from Europe. And it was only after the bursting of China’s real estate bubble, the subsequent slowdown in growth, and in conjunction with U.S. interest rate hikes that the dollar began to flow back.

Dollar hegemony is not automatically established simply by tying it to oil; you must provide capital with a reason to return.